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Institutional selection in international relations: state anarchy as order Hendrik Spruyt In effect, what this question asks is why, at various times and in differing contexts, individuals and groups believe one political form rather than another is best suited to advance their interests.
-Robert Gilpin
At the end of the feudal era, a dramatic economic change occurred. Localized barter exchange started to give way to monetary exchange and translocal trade. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, a variety of new institutional forms had emerged for organizing political and economic life. Sovereign territorial states, city-leagues, and city-states all tried to tap into the new sources of economic wealth, particularly long-distance trade. Indeed, the city-based political organizations initially did very well. In the long run, however, roughly by the middle of the seventeenth century, city-states and city-leagues had fallen by the wayside. In this article, I attempt to answer the question of why this was so and chart how sovereign territorial states displaced their contemporary rivals. I argue that the sovereign territorial state prevailed because it proved more effective at preventing defection by its members, reducing internal transaction costs, and making credible commitments to other units. It did this in three ways. First, sovereign rulers were better at centralizing jurisdiction and authority.' Consequently, they were in a better position to prevent free riding and to gradually rationalize their economies and standardize coinage and weights and measures. This economic rationalization corresponded with a greater capacity to wage war. The institutional makeup of sovereign territorial states thus gave them competitive advantages over other organizational possibilities.
Second, sovereign territoriality, when confirmed to other actors, was a means of structuring interunit behavior.2 States, or rather the political and social elites within sovereign states, preferred similar types of units in their environment because sovereign rulers could more credibly commit the members of their organization (through their control of free riding and defection) and because their authority was exactly specified by territorial parameters.
Third, and as a consequence of the first two conditions, actors from other institutional arrangements defected to states or copied their institutional makeup. Displacement of alternative types thus occurred from the bottom up as well as the top down-actors "voted with their feet" or copied what they perceived to be the superior organizational type.
The principle of sovereign territorial authority differed from other systems of rule. Although inherent in the early medieval attempts to reconstruct the Roman Empire and the attempts of the popes to build a Christian theocracy was a notion of internal hierarchy, both organizational attempts lacked precise territorial specifications. The newer institutional types-the city-leagues and city-states that emerged in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuriesalso differed from sovereign territorial rule. The city-states acknowledged territorial limits but often lacked clear internal hierarchy. The city-leagues had neither, lacking both territorial contiguity and fixed borders (that is, they were not territorially specified). Additionally, they largely were loose confederations having no clear sovereign.
This article begins with the premise that the possibilities of continued feudalism, a centralized empire, and theocracy had all waned by the early fourteenth century.3 The future lay with three new institutional arrangements: the city-league, the city-state, and the sovereign territorial state. The question is why did the last system of rule win out. Thus, while we often talk about the erergence of the state in terms of increased taxing powers, the formation of public rather than private authority, and the growth of the state in terms of scale, those are not the features of the state that this essay will examine. In essence, city-leagues, city-states, and sovereign territorial states were all state forms, but not all had internal hierarchy or territorial limits.4 Instead, the focus 2. The term "international" semantically prejudges the issue, since it is an anachronism for this period.
3. For an argument that these three institutional arrangements had run their course by 1300, see Charles Tilly, of this essay is on a critical feature of the modern state: the principle of sovereignty-the principle that authority is limited by precise spatial terms and is subject to no other authority. Stated another way, authority is territorial and exclusive. The origins of that principle, which came to dominate Europe, can be traced to the late Middle Ages. We need now to explain its dominance.
The next part of this article suggests that two bodies of literature-new institutional history (NIH) and historical sociology-can be useful in analyzing the interaction between markets and hierarchies. Both have analyzed how actors, operating in the absence of higher authority to arbitrate disputes and enforce agreements, try to overcome that difficulty by favoring certain institutional solutions. Historical sociology provides for a taxonomy of how actors in practice have resolved the tensions between markets and hierarchies. The NIH literature provides a variety of tools to explain why institutional arrangements historically have taken a particular shape. Moreover, while it is sometimes claimed that NIH is by definition a post hoc enterprise, I will argue that this approach provides some a priori criteria to suggest which institutions will be more viable in the long run.
The following parts of this article comprise the main body of my argument, beginning with a description of how the old political order-consisting of crosscutting and overlapping jurisdictions of feudal lords, church, emperor, and aspiring but weak kings-proved unsuitable for an emerging precapitalist economic environment.5 The legal climate was unfavorable for trade given the underdevelopment of written codes, the importance of local customary proceedings, the lack of instrumentally rational procedures, and the crosscutting nature of jurisdictions. Economically, commerce suffered from great variation in coinage and in weights and measures and a lack of clearly defined property rights. Transaction costs were high. 6 Newer forms of organization-sovereign territorial states, city-states, and city-leagues-were in essence attempts to solve the discrepancy between emerging translocal markets and existing political arrangements. These forms of organization were all, to some degree, the result of increasing demands by the towns to change the existing order to one more conducive to their preferences and the result of political rulers seeking to expand their revenue and resources. 5 . The literature on emergent capitalism ranges in perspective from a neo-Marxist one to a liberal economic one, focusing on property rights and individual incentives. For This article does not examine the origins of these organizations. The literature on state formation is vast and diverse, and no attempt is made to engage the literature on the emergence of particular systems of rule. There is no suggestion that the territorial state emerged as an optimal solution to individual preferences. Rather, I examine why sovereign territorial states eventually displaced other institutional possibilities in Europe. The emphasis is thus placed on explaining selection among already existing alternatives.
I then compare the account herein to rival explanations and discuss the larger implications of this article. The most obvious conclusion is that the international system can go through dramatic transformations that are distinct from the less comprehensive changes in ordering principle or the distribution of power.7
Two perspectives on markets and hierarchies: new institutionalist theory meets historical sociology When do individuals who engage in economic transactions seek hierarchy? When might political elites seek to capitalize on expanding their rule and when not? Those questions are central to NIH and have a direct bearing on institutional change in international relations.
But whether or not NIH literature can explain actual political outcomes is a matter of debate.8 I argue that this approach can indeed fruitfully be brought to bear on some of these issues, provided it is sensitive enough to historical cases; and here, historical sociology comes in.
The deductive perspective of new institutionalism
The NIH approach explains institutions as contractual agreements between rational individuals. This, of course, need not take the form of a formal contract, but the premise of this view is that individuals engage in strategic exchange. Individuals, whether they behave in an optimizing or satisficing way, pursue the formation of institutional structures that they believe will best meet 7. This lies in contrast to Waltz's view of international systems. His argument is that such systems vary only by ordering principle and capabilities. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of Intemational Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 82ff. While both ordering principle and capability remain critical elements in any understanding of international affairs, they alone do not determine structure. In other realist understandings, the most fundamental type of change in the international system is that of unit change. their interests.9 Traders will prefer institutions that protect them physically and economically. That is, they will prefer systems of rule that help them to enter into stable contracts and that do not charge exorbitant taxes or fees. They will be concerned with ex post reneging and will prefer institutional mechanisms that diminish that probability.10 From their side, political entrepreneurs will seek to capitalize on gains from trade and will seek to expand their rule in order to do so.11 They perform a rough calculus aimed at maintaining or expanding their own political positions.
Following the classic Coase theorem, market arrangements will suffice to achieve efficient solutions. However, when transaction and information costs are not zero, a more hierarchical form of organization is called for. In short, institutions can be explained by microlevel analysis of individuals' preferences and contractual choices. Oliver Williamson thus explains firm organization by individual choices to reduce transaction and information costs.12 That is, when transaction costs are high and property rights are ill-defined, then the contracting actors will benefit from structuring their interactions in a hierarchical fashion. Vertical integration, that is, hierarchy, will be pursued to the point that further integration increases marginal costs of expansion over marginal benefits. 13 Individuals engaging in commerce thus will have reasons to prefer more hierarchy when this reduces information and transaction costs and creates more certitude in their environment. Political entrepreneurs will prefer to extend such hierarchy based on a calculation of a variety of factors. This calculation will depend on their responsiveness to the demands of domestic actors and on the costs of attempting such a strategy.
NIH literature also forces us to focus on the consequences of institutional choice. Two facets of institutional arrangements are critical: the ability to prevent free riding and the ability to credibly commit. The ability to prevent free riding has an obvious internal component. Collective goods will be underprovided unless the group is sufficiently small or unless there is a dominant actor to prevent such free riding.14 But it also has external implications: can a particular actor credibly commit? That is, to what extent can one expect an actor to comply with the terms of an agreement once it has been concluded?15 I will argue that some types of organization (particularly the city-leagues) lacked the ability to credibly commit, either because it was not clear that the negotiating party spoke on behalf of all the members of the organization or because the rulers of such organizations could not prevent free riding by their constituents.
In short, NIH literature can be useful in explaining the preferences for particular institutions. It furthermore contributes to explaining domestic and international consequences of institutional outcomes.
Some problems with new institutionalism
Despite the elegant and parsimonious explanations made possible by this theoretical approach, any extension of this theory from economic organization to political institution building must be made with caution. As NIH proponents themselves suggest, economic and political organizations differ in some fundamental respects. Most notably, the absence of a clear medium of exchange-that is, the absence of profit making as an evaluative mechanism of the rationale of such association-makes comparisons problematic. 16 Second, political associations are based on a variety of individual motives: military protection, ideological affinities, as well as economic rationale.17 Individual kings, lords, clergy, and merchants will have variant sets of preferences. The political bargain struck between them need not a priori be reducible to any particular set of preferences. The resulting organization cannot be reduced to simple optimal efficiency arguments.
Moreover, NIH proponents, because they assume that institutions are basically rational, run the risk of committing a similar error to that of functionalist arguments. Namely, they deduce from the existing institution that its development had to take this particular course: the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy. The existence of the institution is imputed to derive from the functions it performs. NIH assumes a direct connection between the preferences for an institution that would perform certain functions and the actual existence of a In sum, a microlevel focus on the contractual nature of institutions, which empirically takes account of the role that transaction and information costs play in institutional choice, can be useful. It illuminates the reasons for political entrepreneurs and merchants to strike particular bargains. Moreover, it provides for hypotheses on whether or not institutional arrangements will be competitively successful in the long run. Thus one might expect that institutions will be competitively successful if they can prevent free riding and defection. This ability will provide the means to rationalize the domestic economy and reduce transaction and information costs. Additionally, if particular organizational units can reduce the level of defection and ex post reneging between themselves, then they can credibly commit to long-term agreements. If an organization cannot do so, there is good reason to exclude such an actor from the preferred set of units. Historically, sovereign rulers provided focal points to regularize transactions.21 They could do so because they could plausibly speak on behalf of their subjects and commit them. In game-theoretic terms, they were able to engage in iterative behavior.22 18 Two historical solutions to markets and hierarchy Historically, the relation between market and political authority has often taken two forms-imperial organization and ad hoc lord-merchant arrangements. Both forms can be understood within the explanatory framework of NIH.
In traditional empires, most economic interaction takes place within the boundaries of the empire. The geographical extension of political authority roughly corresponds with the spatial extension of the primary market. According to Roberto Unger, "Its most tangible feature is the overall coincidence of economic and political boundaries."23 Anthony Giddens argues that "imperial expansion tends to incorporate all significant economic needs within the domain of the empire itself, relations with groups on the perimeter tending to be unstable."24 Immanuel Wallerstein suggests that economically integrated zones, that is, world systems, often were transformed into empires.25 While such an empire might recognize an outside world, it is regarded as a periphery with which one would deal as a nonequal.26 The overarching hierarchy can be provided by political imperial control, as occurred in China, or by theocratic authority, as occurred in India. 27 The argument does not hold just for traditional empires. Clearly, modern imperial pretensions often have been fostered by coalitions between elites with transnational economic interests and political entrepreneurs. Economic elites might seek resources or markets for their products to which the empire gives them preferential access. Political rulers seek empire as a means of revenue, glory, or manpower. 28 But, of course, not all economic transactions fall within unified political control, even though some traders and rulers might desire such outcomes.29 Even in premodern empires, a substantial amount of trade might be conducted beyond the imperial frontiers. Moreover, imperial preferences will be matched by other actors who seek to delimit such extension. Indeed, the greater the imperial drive, the greater the possibility that a balancing coalition will arise against the imperial actor.30
When commerce occurs across boundaries without political supervision, that is, when the market geographically extends beyond existing political authorities, then merchants must rely on self-help. On the one hand, merchants must strike deals with local lords (or kings) to obtain local protection and trading privileges. Unger terms this set of arrangements "overlord-peddler" agreements. The overlord offers the trader landing rights, unobstructed passage, and protection in exchange for certain fees or taxes. In essence, traders must strike deals themselves, deals that are ad hoc and subject to defection by the local lord. In NIH terms, merchants had to try to create institutional arrangements that limited the incentives for ex post reneging. It was unknown whether the other party would respect the terms of the bargain. As a result, long-distance trade often was conducted by merchants who were related by kin or of similar cultural background.31 Clan ties, reputation, and shared culture were critical to commerce, since such traits had particular advantages in preventing reneging and in reducing transaction and information problems.32
The problem of hierarchy and markets generally has been solved in two ways. In the imperial logic of organization, political elites might benefit from expanding their authority over the relevant sphere of economic transaction. They might do so to gain more revenue or tribute or to expand their power base. Merchants might acquiesce to such rule as it might create more certitude in their market environment.33 The Roman Empire thus benefited both emperor and merchant. Similarly, the lamented "barbarian" extension of Mongol rule over much of the Eurasian continent in fact benefited trade by placing East-West trade routes under unified political control. Such developments reduced uncertainty by providing protection against infringement of property rights, violation of contracts, and outright predation by robbers and local lords. Such rule might reduce transaction costs by providing for certain coinage and particular weights and measures and by reducing the amount of legal customs. 33. One might object that this expansion should not be perceived as a contract between ruler and ruled. However, if one assumes that at least a minimum of quasi-compliance is necessary for a trading system to continue, then a purely extortionist government will destroy its own basis of revenue should it tax its merchants to the point that there are no incentives to continue to engage in commercial activity.
Imperial authority, however, might have a negative consequence: it might exploit traders who, given that the market lies primarily within the empire, would have little opportunity for exit short of surrendering their occupation altogether. Unified control over the market is thus a double-edged sword.
In a decentralized logic of organization, merchants have to strike deals with lords on an ad hoc basis. This reduces the ability of long-term predation by one lord because a merchant can shift to another. But it increases protection problems and magnifies the uncertainty and transaction costs of crossboundary trade without political protection. (This might be one reason why trade across boundaries was often luxury trade. High profit margins compensated for high risks and transaction costs.)
In Europe a third arrangement emerged. When trade increased in the late Middle Ages, imperial organization, either in the form of the Holy Roman Empire or Roman theocracy, failed. But this did not mean that merchants now had to fend for themselves. The overlord-peddler deals increasingly became supervised and routinized by a variety of political authorities. Of these, sovereign territoriality proved to have long-term advantages in that it created more certitude in the domestic economic environment. It reduced free riding and transaction costs more efficiently than the alternatives. Externally, sovereign authority became a focal point around which to conduct international affairs. In short, the success of the territorial state can at least partially be understood by its solution to the tension between markets and hierarchies.
The feudal era: local trade and barter exchange Feudalism essentially entailed decentralized political authority, private possession of the means of violence, and the lack of any distinction between public and private authority.34 Those political factors created an environment that greatly hindered commerce. While goods were produced primarily for local consumption and exchange was largely in-kind, this posed few problems. The late medieval expansion of trading opportunities, however, necessitated some institutional changes.
The feudal barriers to trade were varied. First, feudal organization lacked the absolute exclusion that we attach to private property. Instead, continued possession over time, seisin, established the legitimacy of the holder. Since production consisted mainly of agricultural commodities that were traded by barter and often took place in the context of reciprocal feudal relations, this was a workable solution. Holdings were embedded in a system of mutual 34 . The characteristic features of feudalism are the subjects of long-standing disputes. Strayer's description is widely accepted, and that is the one I use here. See Joseph Strayer, Feudalism (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1965), p. 13. obligations, and thus one could not easily convey any exclusive right to a third party. 35 Second, given that money was scarce, feudal obligations of necessity revolved around in-kind transfers.36 Indeed, the very basis of feudal organization was centered around the granting of land by a high lord or king to a lesser vassal. Lords or knights of the manor demanded in-kind goods and services from the peasants and serfs who worked the lands, in exchange for which they were granted protection. All such relations were highly personalized and contextspecific.
The legal system further hindered commercial transactions. Feudalism evolved into a system of preferential birth and operated as a closed caste system favoring the warrior aristocracy.37 No amount of material wealth dispelled the difference between commoner and noble. This entailed preferential judicial procedures such as trial by ordeal and combat and judgment by noble peers rather than by inferiors. Clearly such arrangements did not work in favor of the burghers who sought more rational means of contract enforcement.
The high degree of localized rule also yielded a diversity of legal customs.38 Given that even lesser lords had acquired previously royal rights to pass judgment, so-called banal justice, each locality had its own legal particularities.39 This situation was only exacerbated by the general absence of written law-with the exception of southern France and Italy, the lands of the droit ecrit (written law). Thus northern France, the land of the droit coutumier (customary law), was governed roughly by three hundred local customary codes. 40 Transaction costs were raised further by the fact that secular and ecclesiastical lords used their own weights and measures. Indeed, manipulation of such measures could yield tidy profits for local lords. They furthermore required traders to use their measures and weights at a given location, of course paying a fee to the lord for such use. By the late Middle Ages, England had hundreds of 35 Finally, lords minted their own coins. In France there were perhaps three hundred minters; in Germany, perhaps six hundred. Each Italian town had its own mint.42 Traders thus had to learn which exchange rates were operative, whether or not the local lords recently had debased their currency, what the gold value of such coin might be, and so forth.
All such matters made the conduct of any business a highly speculative and sometimes dangerous affair. In the terms of new institutionalism, transaction and information costs were high, and the danger of ex post reneging was ubiquitous.
As long as barter and local exchange prevailed, none of this was particularly problematic. By the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, however, a dramatic economic transformation began to take place.43 Wastelands and forests were cleared, and agricultural production and trade began to expand. This economic revival had several causes-decreasing invasions, improved agricultural production, possibly even a change in weather. However, the most critical factor in this transformation was the role played by long-distance trade.44 Trade made increasing division of labor possible. Consequently, many new towns were founded, and existing towns grew in the wake of this economic boom. Indeed, many current European towns trace their founding to this period. 45 The growth of towns caused a new political group to emerge: the burghers or town dwellers. The existing institutions had favored the interests and perspectives of clergy and feudal lords. The new actors, the townspeople, had little 41 influence in that political set of arrangements. Thus, coupled with the rise of the towns, a new set of interests and ideological perspectives emerged with a new set of demands. The feudal order-based on crosscutting jurisdictions and on ill-defined property rights and judicial procedures-did not fit the burghers' mercantile pursuits. Market exchange and trade required abstract contractual obligations with money as a medium.46 The emergence of towns thus created a dynamic element in the European political system. As Georges Duby wrote, "Central to the revitalized principalities, towns now held the key position in the political order that slowly emerged from the tangle of feudal relations."47
Despite the opposition of the feudal aristocracy, the German emperor, and the church, the economic transformation made new political arrangements possible. Most accounts argue that the possibilities of continued feudalism, a centralized empire, and theocracy had waned by the early fourteenth century.48 The future lay with three new institutional innovations: the city-league, the city-state, and the sovereign territorial state. All three responded in some degree to the demands of commercial actors, that is, of the townspeople. Sovereign territorial states emerged particularly in England and France, while city-states gradually arose out of the roughly two hundred to three hundred independent communes of Italy. Germany became the primary location of city-leagues, which united to curtail predation by the lords.
All three were able to respond to the precapitalist opportunities of the period. It is thus a mistake to argue that sovereign territorial states supplanted feudal organization in a linear and sequential way. All three institutional arrangements-city-league, city-state, and sovereign territorial state-could mobilize more resources than could traditional feudal organization. The question is not why territorial states replaced feudalism but why they ultimately managed to displace their contemporary competitors.
In short, until the late Middle Ages, European political development differed little from that elsewhere. Decentralized political authority necessitated ad hoc bargains and reliance on self-help by social actors. Alternatively, both emperor and pope attempted to reestablish imperial organization. In Europe none of these possibilities-feudal lordships, empire, or theocracyeventually carried the day. Instead, the dramatic economic change led to institutional innovation unique to the European historical experience.
We might conjecture that the new institution that would ultimately prove most successful would be the one that could lessen the problems of feudal particularism the most. number of crosscutting and rival jurisdictions. By centralizing justice and authority, it could also reduce defection by its constituents. Furthermore, internal hierarchy would reduce the number of legal codes, standardize judicial procedure, and provide for an appeals process. In the economic sphere, an organization's success might be measured by the centralization of coinage and the standardization of weights and measures. Consequently, if one accepts that standardizations of laws, weights and measures, and coinage are at least some of the prerequisites for a modern economy, then we have a priori indicators of success. Furthermore, given that European trade would be transboundary trade, a successful institution could a priori be specified as an institution that could credibly commit to international agreements. Of the new institutional types that emerged in the late Middle Ages, which performed these functions most successfully in the course of the next centuries?
Rivalry and selection among the new institutional possibilities
Sovereign territorial rule
The possibility of unified political control over the primary area of economic interactions (the imperial solution) had failed by the early fourteenth century. The expanding level of trade, therefore, occurred across political boundaries. Consequently, traders had to work out arrangements of their own, such as the development of merchant law,49 and had to negotiate with a variety of political authorities over whose borders they crossed.
Rulers, however, realized that rationalizing the economies of their kingdoms and facilitating trade were in their own interests. Consequently, they became involved in both domestic and international tasks. Internally, political authorities gradually became involved in creating an efficient domestic economy by combating feudal particularism. Externally, they began to create conditions that made long-term iterative behavior predictable and relatively stable. In fact, as P. H. Sawyer wrote, "One of the prerogatives claimed by English kings in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was the right to regulate merchants and commerce."50
One aspect of such regulation was the attempt to centralize and regulate coinage. The dissemination of mints (for example, the small duchy of Berry alone had twelve different mints) correlated with frequent depreciation by many of the minting lords.51 To combat such fragmentation, the early Capetian kings declared royal currency to be the only currency of the French realm.52 Although feudal lords continued to mint coins, their area of usage increasingly was limited to that area immediately under each's control. The number of mints declined from roughly three hundred to thirty by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the end of the Capetian reign.53
Although English minting already was much more centralized, the English king tried to decrease further the number of baronial mints. Moreover, English traders benefited from a regular currency that was debased only rarely.54
Monarchs also tried to standardize weights and measures. Here the French king initially was less successful. It was clear to the bourgeois, however, that only a hierarchical form of government could ultimately make inroads in that direction. Philip V (1316-22) was one of the first French monarchs to regulate weights and measures, but others continued the policy. Louis XI in the fifteenth century, Louis XII in the reform of 1508, and Francis I and Henry II in a variety of edicts in 1540, 1557, 1575, and 1579 all tried to reduce the mind-boggling variety of measures then used throughout the kingdom.55 In England, central authority made greater inroads into standardizing weights and measures. Some progress already had been made beginning in the twelfth century. In 1317, the crown had ordered that the standards of London be used. Other orders, such as the statute of 1389 and the parliamentary legislation of 1413, further declared standards and specified penalties for offenders. But the movement toward standardization received particular impetus during the Tudor government. In the words of Ronald Zupko, "Before the imperial weights and measures era began in the third decade of the nineteenth century, no period in English history was as important from the standpoint of physical standards as the Tudor."56 Particularism and customary procedures in the legal field also were tackled. By the middle of the thirteenth century, kings had forbade trial by combat and ordeal.57 Rulers tried to decrease local particularism by insisting on hierarchical appeal procedures and by turning to Roman (that is, written) law for greater certitude. Roman law not only justified sovereign rule, and hence was desirable from the king's position for that reason alone, but it also contained developed theories of property. While English law did not take the same route, there too kings began to rationalize judicial procedure. As early as the twelfth century, Henry II had started to revolutionize "the system of law in England primarily by imposing royal jurisdiction, and royal law, upon criminal and civil matters that had previously been under local and feudal jurisdiction," in the words of Harold Berman.58 One of the dimensions of this royal jurisdiction was greater protection for those who were illegitimately dispossessed. This occurred even prior to the development of such principles in Roman law on the Continent.59
Externally, kings started to act as representatives of their domestic constituencies.60 For example, the French king claimed during the Hundred Years War that only he was allowed to negotiate with the English.6' Government also became involved in regulating trade. According to Jacques Bernard, "They strictly controlled all 'letters of mark' and reprisals against foreign merchants, and in their place substituted due process of law.... they also tried to guarantee the authenticity, validity and execution of trading agreements."62 Gradually, merchant law, the system of law that the merchants had administered themselves in an ingenious self-help construction, was replaced by royal law.63 To use Nettl's term, sovereign rulers became the gatekeepers separating their domestic realms from the international arena. 64 The process of rationalizing the economy and centralizing the judicial system was a lengthy one. England was initially much more successful than France. Still, the latter had also made considerable inroads into centralization even before Jean-Baptiste Colbert's mercantilist policies of the early seventeenth century. In short, from the very beginning of sovereign territorial rule, which was formally claimed by kings in the late thirteenth century and throughout the 57 preindustrial era, monarchs worked toward eliminating the remnants of feudal particularism. Of course, kings and queens had reasons of their own to do so. By providing such goods, they obtained the support of the towns and thereby capital. Moreover, by enhancing the economic well-being of the realm, they increased their own ability to raise more revenue.65
The city-league: fragmented sovereignty and nonterritoriality
The city-league lies in starkest contrast to the state. The most powerful of such leagues was the Hanseatic League, or Hansa, which consisted of 160-200 towns and monopolized most of the northern trade.66 This league did not adopt the principle of sovereign territoriality. It had no clear internal hierarchy and no territorial borders to mark its jurisdiction. Because of its importance, and because its organization was typical of many other city-leagues (such as the Rhenish League, the Saxon League, the Swabian League, and others), I will take the case of the Hansa as representative of city-leagues in general.
Unlike the situation in England and France, where the interests of the monarch in an efficient economy corresponded with those of the burghers, no central authority could legitimately claim to be a provider of internal collective goods in the Hansa. Each town mistrusted the objectives of the others. In such an arena of mutual distrust, economic transactions remained unstable. Efforts by Lubeck, Hamburg, or Bremen, say, to standardize weights and measures met with noncooperation. Consequently, city-league members continued to use a variety of weights and measures to their own advantage.67 Moreover, to complicate matters even further, measures might vary with the distance from the point of origin. That is to say, traders manipulated measures to hide illicit profit margins from ecclesiastical scrutiny.
One way of attempting to overcome this lack of collective action and create greater standardization was the demand of the Hansetag (the Hanseatic Parliament) that its regional associations adopt the standards of one of the dominant towns of that region. The Dutch towns, for example, were expected to follow the lead of Cologne. But the Dutch, of course, benefited from using and manipulating their own measures and hence had little reason to comply.68
Nor could the many Hanseatic towns agree on which currency to use and who should mint it. The Hansa saw the use of Brandenburg talers, Lubeck and Prussian marks, Rhenish guilders, Flemish pounds, and other currencies. The various attempts to standardize coinage, for example through the Wendish union on coinage, failed miserably. Relative to England and France, Hanseatic currencies remained in disarray.69
Legal codes also remained diverse throughout the Hansa. Daughter cities adopted the codes of mother cities in an ad hoc manner. Some cities adopted the legal code of Lubeck, others accepted codes from Magdeburg, Hamburg, or other towns.70 Furthermore, enforcement and implementation of the decisions of the Hanseatic parliament were left to the individual towns. Although the Hansa provided for punishment, such as exclusion, for towns that defected, in general the sanctioning process left a great deal of leeway for individual shirking.
Given the lack of effective control of each town over the others, even the major towns tended to pursue their own objectives rather than provide for collective goods as a hegemonic power might. Thus, despite the political organization of the Hansa, members continued to rely on mechanisms usually associated with self-help systems to organize trade. One such mechanism was the implementation of ordinances to ensure the maintenance of strong family ties. Marrying non-Hanseatics was forbidden and business partnerships with them could be penalized by the loss of two fingers.7'
The distrust among Hanseatic members not only obstructed efforts for greater centralization but at the same led to free riding when external collective activity was called for. While the Hansa was sometimes quite successful in waging war, there was always the danger of individual cities refusing to fulfill their obligations. Thus, the Saxon members were slow to support the Wendish towns in the war with Denmark. Sovereign actors deliberately profited from this lack of unity. For example, the Danish king claimed that certain privileges were due to the Wendish but not the Prussian towns, although privileges had in fact been agreed upon for the Hansa as a whole. The Prussians drew the incorrect conclusion that the Wendish towns had defected and had negotiated private benefits of their own. 74 The lack of clear sovereign authority also made it difficult for the league to credibly commit itself to international agreements. Treaties were negotiated by the league as a whole, but individual towns were able to choose whether to ratify the treaty or not. Thus, although Prussian towns refused to sign the peace treaty with England in 1437, the Hansa nevertheless insisted that English concessions were due to the Prussians.75 When English negotiators in the sixteenth century demanded a list of all Hanseatic towns so that they could know which ships could legitimately claim the specific privileges that the Hansa had negotiated, the league refused.76 It feared that the crown would seek to negotiate with individual towns at the expense of the league as a whole, a not illusory danger, since England stood to gain by enticing towns to defect.77
From its side, the league would occasionally welcome free riding to exonerate itself from any responsibility for infractions of international agreements. For example, when England claimed that members of the Hansa engaged in piracy and violated agreements thereon, the Hanseatic League argued that it had no control over individual towns. In other words, it had no clear means to deal with free riding. 78 The Hansa thus could not credibly commit itself to long-term iterative relationships with other governments since it could not control individual towns' incentives to free ride. Benefits of defection would accrue to the individual town, whereas the costs would be borne by all. Moreover, the Hansa itself benefited from obfuscating which members were part of the league, and hence non-Hanseatics often distrusted their negotiating partners.
Finally, the Hansa did not follow the principle of territorial delimitation of its authority.79 It had no recognized borders. Consequently, its attempts to bring new members into the league ran directly counter to the interests of sovereign state actors, posing to them the same danger as imperial logics of organization. Indeed, the Hansa acquired privileges in England that exempted it from parliamentary statutes.80
In short, the city-league had problems with establishing internal hierarchy, and consequently it was less successful than states in standardizing coinage and centralizing jurisdiction. Externally, it was not able to credibly commit to international treaties. Moreover, given its lack of clearly defined territorial jurisdiction, it was less compatible with the territorial units in the international system. In the Peace of Westphalia, for example, the princes refused to recognize the league.81 However, individual cities such as Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck were considered imperial cities (hence, de facto independent) and as city-states were allowed to participate.82 The league therefore was refused not on the basis of the total material resources at its disposal but on the basis of its particular organizational logic. The structure of the league was such that it did not fit that of an international state system: it was not a like type.
I do not suggest that the material resources of the organization are irrelevant altogether. It would be difficult to exclude the Hansa in its prime. However, a material explanation alone cannot clarify why so many small actors continued as legitimate actors in international relations. Bremen, Hamburg, and many others were considered independent actors for many centuries after Westphalia. While their limited resources might have made them second-or third-order players in international politics, they were considered as legitimate players.83
The demise of the Hansa, therefore, had several causes. First, it was due to the competitive nature of the international system in which it was confronted by rival forms of organization. Sovereign states proved better at mobilizing their societies and enhancing their domestic economies. Territorial units gradually encroached on the independence of the cities that were members of the league. Parallel with this "Darwinian" selective process were the choices of 80. Lloyd, England and the German Hanse, p. 375. 81. Krasner is right in pointing out that Westphalia is not a dramatic break with the past. I see it as a codification of practices already under way centuries before that. Nevertheless, it does serve a useful purpose as a benchmark signifying that the formation of a state system was coming to fruition. See Stephen Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 235-64.
82. Hans-Bernd Spies, "Lulbeck, die Hanse und der Westfalische Frieden" (Luibeck, the Hansa, and the Peace of Wesphalia), Hansische Geschichtsblatter 100 (1932), pp. 110-24.
83. Structuration theorists might frame this in terms of the system empowering only like actors. See, for example, Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, p. 282. Rephrased this implies that actors recognize other units only on their terms-they admit only other states as legitimate actors in international relations. individuals to form or join units they perceived as superior modes of organization. 84 The German princes thus started to mimic the administrative processes and legal framework of territorial states.85 Towns, no longer convinced of the benefits of membership in the league, defected to the protection of territorial rulers or styled themselves as independent states in their own right-however small they might be. But the demise of the Hansa also proceeded along another dimension of mutual empowerment and mutual recognition. The Hansa-nonterritorial in nature, with only a weakly established hierarchy, and fraught with free riding-did not fit a system of territorially demarcated states where sovereigns could credibly negotiate on behalf of the members of their societies.
City-states and fragmented sovereignty
City-states shared characteristics of both sovereign territorial states and city-leagues. Internally, city-states looked somewhat like leagues in that they lacked the clear internal hierarchy of sovereign territorial states. Indeed, Charles Tilly describes both such urban organizations as fragmented sovereignties.86 When the two hundred to three hundred independent communes of northern Italy gradually were incorporated into about a dozen larger citystates, they were given inferior status, roughly similar to that of colonies.87 Such subjugated towns, however, retained much autonomy. According to Giorgio Chittolini, "Large responsibilities were left to cities-a distribution of power that some historians have called a diarchy." 88 Conversely, the inhabitants of the subjugated cities did not enjoy the benefits that derived from being a citizen of such dominant cities as Venice and Florence.89 When threatened by foreign powers, the subjugated towns often would favor foreign powers over their own dominant city. The subject cities perceived Venice as "the city of three thousand tyrants."90 Consequently they were usually garrisoned by troops of the dominant town.
This lack of internal unity can be seen in the lack of rationalization of internal economies. Although much research needs still to be done, particularly on city-states after the Renaissance, the evidence suggests that-not unexpectedly, given these divisions and lack of centralization-weights and measures were standardized relatively late. Most standardization did not occur until the eighteenth century. 91 The lack of unity also was visible in the tensions between capital and subject cities on economic matters. For example, evidence suggests that Venice deliberately kept some industries on its mainland from developing so as to prevent competition with Venice itself. 92 On currency issues, less diversity was seen, with the currency of the dominant city being the one usually accepted throughout the city-state. Particularly, Venice seems to have established a relatively stable currency system.93
Legal codes in the city-states, however, remained diverse. Guilds, aristocracy, clergy, and the subject towns retained their own legal authority. Jean-Claude Hocquet wrote that Venice "did not dream of issuing an ordinance that might have applied to the entire state." 94 In general, while in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sovereign territorial states were on their way to rationalizing their economies, the opposite tendency seemed at work in Italy. Although the various ruling elites of the city-states had attempted to transform themselves into territorial states, they were largely unsuccessful. As Michael Knapton describes, Venice took "no planned action to create a more economically integrated region with deliberate policies to favour freer patterns of internal flow of goods."95 Italy thus remained plagued by "the survival of innumerable transit duties" and suffered from the continued existence of "protectionist duties and internal in barriers to trade," in Stuart Woolf s words. 96 Indeed, according to many historians, the Italian city-states refeudalized. Their internal fragmentation blocked their transformation into more integrated and rationalized economies. To again quote Woolf, feudal forms of tenure became "obstacles to the possession of full property rights."97 Indeed, territorial demarcation between such city-states once again became amorphous, since feudatories held contiguous domains across borders. 98 Externally, however, city-states behaved much like sovereign territorial states. They recognized formal territorial limits to their jurisdiction-that is, they accepted borders-and routinized their diplomatic representation.99 While the subjugated towns retained much local autonomy, as far as external affairs were concerned the dominant cities represented the entire city-state. 100 In other words, city-states had the means of establishing credible commitments.101
Unlike the city-leagues, the city-states died a slow death. While city-leagues were unacceptable to the other actors in the system, city-states were considered legitimate members of the international community, given that they were territorially defined and provided clear focal points for negotiation. Unlike the city-league, the system of rule of the city-state was not inherently at odds with the principle of territorially circumscribed authority.
Competitively, however, the city-states suffered from some of the same problems as the leagues, in that they lacked internal unity and consequently were slow in rationalizing their economies. While they formally did not come to an end until their incorporation by Napoleon, their decline had begun much earlier.
Because sovereign territorial states were competitively more successful, individuals turned to those institutional models for inspiration. When political elites recognized the consequences of localism and the lack of economic integration in their city-states, they turned to the territorial rules of Frederick and Catherine the Great as models worthy of emulation. 102 In sum, some political and social actors will prefer institutions that can reduce uncertainty in their internal and external environments. Specifically in commerce, actors will prefer organizations that reduce transaction and information costs and can prevent expost reneging. Sovereign authority did just that. Sovereign rulers centralized fragmented political systems and thus reduced legal uncertainty and domestic transaction costs. As a consequence, by preventing free riding and by rationalizing their economies, such systems of rule were able gradually to expand the level of resources they could bring to bear against opponents. Unity and integrated economies were prerequisites for success in war.
But sovereign authorities also reduced the problems facing transboundary trade by providing for clear focal points through which to negotiate. Such rulers, moreover, could more credibly commit their subjects to long-term agreements. Hence states had good reasons to prefer like units, that is, other sovereign territorial states, in their environment.
Consequently, individuals had reasons to mimic those successful institutions and to shift loyalties. Individuals emulated what they perceived to be successful arrangements in order to reduce uncertainty and gain legitimacy.103
A brief comparison with alternative accounts
No doubt behind the decline of the Italian city-states and the Hansa lay many causes. Changing trade routes, technological breakthroughs in oceanic shipping, even migrating herring (in the case of the Hansa) have been suggested as causal variables. This essay does not disavow the importance of those variables. Instead, it draws attention to the internal and external consequences of particular types of rule. Thus, while it specifically examines the Hansa and the Italian city-states, it means to suggest why they as institutional types were less successful-why their characteristics made them less successful-than sovereign territorial states.
Are there alternative independent variables that explain equally well the general nature of unit change in the European system between roughly 1300 and 1650? Given the anarchical nature of the international system and considering the frequent occurrence of conflict in preindustrial Europe, we do well to ask how the above account squares with the prevalent view that changes in warfare lay at the heart of state formation.
Much of the discussion of the causes of the feudal-state transformation is at cross-purposes. The question of whether war made states centers around the growth in extractive capacities of government. Changes in warfare favored larger and more expensive armies, which necessitated more taxation and rational government. That issue largely has been settled. Warfare indeed has had a profound effect on the growth of government and the influence of government on society.104 That is to say, when "state" denotes "formal government" there is little doubt that protracted conflict has influenced the size and functions of public authority.
The question examined by this essay, though, is why did this particular form of state prevail. What precisely about a public authority that was hierarchical and spatially defined caused it to survive when the other two types of authority, city-leagues and city-states, seemed also quite viable? One might argue that because states were superior in waging war, defeated city-leagues and city-states were absorbed into them. But such an account needs elaboration and specification. For instance, the ability to wage war itself must first be explained. To argue that a particular institutional form, that is, the sovereign territorial form, was superior at war begs the question. Why was it superior? Most accounts imply that military superiority was largely a function of size, and in so doing, they neglect the consequences of institutional characteristics. 105 Some researchers have compared the institutional efficiency of different territorial states, by analyzing the relative efficiency of similar types of units. Barry Weingast and Douglass North, for example, have taken a public choice approach to investigate why England was able to raise capital at low rates, and hence wage war at considerably less cost than France.106 But the present article is one of the first studies of the institutional efficacy of different types of units, comparing territorial states to their contemporary alternatives.
Second, since city-states were at one time as powerful and resourceful as sovereign states or even more so, one might ask why states survived that initial period. Indeed, in many cases the revenue of the Italian city-states outstripped that of the emerging sovereign territorial states. And if money is the sinew of power, then during this period of mercenary armies the answer to that question is not straightforward.107 Furthermore, it is said that many Italian towns were able to bring large armies to bear, even compared with France: by some estimates Genoa could raise an army of forty thousand in 1295.108 The Rhenish-Swabian League united about eighty-nine towns to oppose their feudal overlords in 1385. In 1377 a league of southern German cities defeated not only the Count of Wurttemberg, against whom they had allied, but also the forces of Emperor Charles IV when he chose to back the count. The Hansa frequently waged war with Denmark, England, Holland, and Sweden. In Fernand Braudel's estimate, initially the balance swung against territorial states.109 Size was an imperfect predictor of how the Darwinian process would work and suggests, therefore, that institutional efficiency might matter considerably.
Moreover, the ability to wage war cannot explain why so many small territorial states survived. If the possession of considerable military force is the only explanation of which units survive, why did Germany-as well as Italy-see the survival of independent cities and miniature principalities until well into the nineteenth century? While city-leagues and city-states were occasionally defeated militarily, such setbacks did not lead to their ends as institutional types. The Hansa's decline was slow and not premised on any particular military defeat. Likewise, confrontations with territorial states did not end the phenomenon of the city-state.
Admittedly, the aggregate size of political organization is not irrelevantsmall towns can hardly wield as much force as great empires no matter their institutional efficacy-but it is an imperfect predictor of success. For example, the decline of the Italian city-state is sometimes explained by reference to the size of France and Spain, which invaded the Italian peninsula in the sixteenth century. Sovereign states were larger and hence could mobilize larger armies and raise more revenue. However, those wishing to pursue that explanation should recall that the Republic of the Netherlands, a leading power if not the hegemon of the seventeenth century, had as many citizens as Venice (1.5 million). Similarly, England, with only 40 percent of France's population and much less territorial area under its control, was able to match France and Spain quite well. The Republic of the Netherlands and England were able to fight empires and larger states successfully before acquiring empires themselves. In short, while acknowledging that success has multiple explanations, my particular emphasis is the effectiveness and efficiency of particular institutional arrangements in mobilizing and rationalizing their domestic economies. That in turn is an important factor in determining military success.
Consequently, the approach here suggests answers to some of the puzzles mentioned above. First, continued internal particularism might partially 108 The approach taken here has, therefore, much in common with the work pioneered by North and Robert Thomas, by Margaret Levi, and by others. Nevertheless, there are significant differences. First, NIH is susceptible to particular methodological flaws. This article has tried to avoid some of those pitfalls by looking at competition between simultaneously existing alternative institutions, without suggesting that any of those competing institutions was an optimal outcome.1"' A variety of factors intervenes between preferences and the creation of institutions. For example, second-order collective action problems may prevent the creation of such an institution. Moreover, dominant social and political elites also need not have overall efficiency as their primary preference. A complete account of institutional emergence requires retracing the old institutions and the changes in relative power among social actors that enable them to pursue new institutional choices, and analysis of the overall bargain struck to create coalitions in favor of institutional change. That cannot be done within the scope of this essay. I have looked only at the relative efficiency of simultaneously competing institutions during a specific period.
Second, this article draws attention to aspects of institutional selection other than Darwinian struggles. Competitive success also depends on what actors themselves find to be acceptable as a unit. They enforce their choices through recognition of which types of units can more credibly commit and hence form preferable partners in international deals.
Third, in trying to avoid a tautological use of transaction costs, this article has tried to operationalize such costs and credible commitments in a plausible way. I have defined transaction costs as the general costs of concluding any type of contract in a given economy, rather than as the costs between ruler and ruled.112
Fourth, I have extended transaction costs and property rights analysis by the suggestion that these are heavily influenced by whether or not a political unit has a clear sovereign authority who has an incentive to reduce such costs and provide for protection of such rights. That is, I have suggested a specific independent variable to account for the variation between different units.
Before concluding, I must note that I have not examined the question of why states ultimately extended across the globe.113 The focus has been narrow, looking only at why states displaced other European institutions. I do not claim to have accounted for the ultimate decline of Ming China, Tokugawa Japan, or other imperial organizations. However, the logic herein might be used to extend the argument in that direction. For example, one could argue first, that because of the plurality of discrete jurisdictions, no political actor could exploit his or her subjects to the same extent as imperial rulers could. That is to say, within a state system, predation is limited because social actors have more opportunity to exit that political system and to seek refuge and better environments elsewhere. The flight of the Huguenots and the migration of Jews from Antwerp to Amsterdam are but two such examples; while the reasons behind each reason are complex, clearly both movements had large economic repercussions. Even French absolutism was limited in scope. 114 Second, the development of the individual states was driven by the very fact that states interacted frequently and competitively. An isolationist policy such as that pursued by Tokugawa Japan simply was impossible. Competition drove internal development and institutional innovation.115
Third, one might examine to what extent such empires were compatible with a system of de jure equivalent actors. Since empires deny others such equivalence, state actors would have an incentive to prefer similar institutional arrangements elsewhere.
Conclusion and implications
Why then did sovereign territorial states "win out" over rival institutional forms? The answer advanced here lies along three dimensions. One causal variable was competitive institutional efficiency. Sovereign territorial authority proved superior to its contemporary rivals due to its internal structure. While rival forms of organization initially might have controlled more resources, in the long run sovereign authority proved to be better at combating the fragmentation of feudal authority. Such rule could take the form of absolutist government as in France or of a king-in-parliament as in England, but in all cases authority was centralized. Polities such as the Republic of the Netherlands, which lacked a formal sovereign, made up for that lack by the de facto 115. As John Hall points out, that argument already had been made by Gibbon. Hall, Powers and Liberties, p. 14.
hegemony of one city, Amsterdam, which produced much of Dutch revenue and effectively ran the country. In the long run, however, the lack of formal institutionalized central government hurt even the Dutch.1"6
In addition, territorial demarcation of jurisdiction with internal hierarchy proved to be an effective way of structuring international relations. By monopolizing external interactions with other units, sovereign rulers provided focal points through which to regularize international relations. This second aspect of institutional efficiency goes hand in hand with the first. The less the political fragmentation, the greater the ability to mobilize society and prevent defection and free riding. This in turn yielded a greater ability to commit credibly. Hence sovereign territorial states could achieve long-term gains.
Third, sovereign territorial states proved mutually compatible. Indeed, borders are explicit agreements on respective spheres of jurisdiction. States are de jure equivalent, although de facto, of course, they are not.117 By their spatial delimitation, they recognize that there is no logical necessity why such authorities should encroach upon one another. Nonterritorial forms of organization such as the city-league then or pan-Arabism today are logically at odds with sovereign statehood.118
Fourth, once the benefits of internal centralization and the ability of sovereign territorial states to engage in longer-term commitments to one another became clear, actors began to imitate such institutions or defect to them.
This account of how and why sovereign territorial states displaced other institutional types might shed some light on the question of why the sovereign territorial state continues to exist given the apparent tension between spatially defined authority and the increasingly nonspatial nature of the international economy.119 Put another way, why have states become, and why do they continue to be, the constitutive units of the international system despite the fact that the level of economic interaction has increased so much ?120 This article suggests a partial answer to that question. Political entrepreneurs and social groups had good reasons to prefer a system of sovereign states: such units created some measure of regularity and predictability in both their domestic economies and in international relations. The principle of territorially delimited authority, which was sovereign within those borders, delineated what was to be "domestic" and what "international.121 Only those forms of political organization that were based on such distinctions were recognized by other actors. Despite the much-lamented existence of sovereign territoriality,'22 it is in fact a method of structuring international relations that makes interactions more predictable and regularized. In game theoretic terms, sovereign territorial states could play iterative games, at which other units were less adept, precisely because others' governments could not credibly commit themselves; the confederated nature of city-leagues made them particularly suspect.
The previous argument thus differs from the Grotian position advanced by Hedley Bull and others.123 That is to say, I do not contend that territorial states create a particular international society but that the particular internal makeup of a unit, specifically of the sovereign territorial state, had external consequences. In the Grotian argument the particular characteristics of the unit largely are irrelevant. The Grotian argument is a sociological one in that it explains how units act within a given set of intersubjective rules.
Although the lack of government clearly is a fundamental problem of international relations, I disagree with the structural realist position that certain patterns of order are imposed only by hierarchy and the distribution of power.'24 Just as the distribution of power in the system imposes certain behaviors on actors, so the dominant types of unit have consequences for cooperation and conflict. Indeed, which type of unit gains dominance in a given era itself determines who is to count as an international actor in the first place. Thus, whichever type of unit becomes the constitutive unit of the international system at a given time determines whom we understand to be an international actor operating under anarchy and whom we consider a domestic actor operating under hierarchy.125 Sovereign government works as a gatekeeper.
This essay, therefore, provides an empirical and material explanation of a facet that structuration theory has highlighted but not explained. Given that the nature of a system needs to be accounted for by the actions of its agents (i.e., states), we need to explain why states empowered only like units-other states. Alexander Wendt argues that since individual discrete units are taken as given, "the most important weakness of neorealism's individualist approach ... is that it fails to provide a basis for developing an explicit theory of the state."126 This essay contends that there were material reasons for agents to empower only similar types of units, thus creating a structure that severely limited subsequent possibilities for other types of units.
The notion that every international actor had to have some form of internal hierarchy and external demarcation also led to a determination of what was "private" and what "public." As Janice Thomson has shown, actors classified as private were disallowed into the international system. For example, piracy was for a long time a perfectly legitimate policy for sovereign states, but it gradually was disallowed because it did not fit the mold of internal hierarchy and external demarcation. Were pirates subjects of territorial states and hence private actors subject to the public authority of their sovereign? Or were they actors who worked interstitially in the state system and hence had to be weeded out?127 The same held true for mercenaries. Sovereign territorial states gradually phased out their use. 128 The use of force by nonstate actors did not fit the territorial mode of authority whereby international relations were conducted by sovereign governments.
The specification of internal and external realms continues as a constitutive rule of international affairs. It is exactly because a state system is an ordering device that one state is reluctant to interfere in another state's affairs. That is, we have equated sovereignty with autonomy. Since states have been one way of ordering international relations, ethnic and irredentist movements define themselves as statist in their intent. With the possible exception of Islamic fundamentalism, movements define themselves in the terms of the international state system in order to be recognized by the other members. They claim international legitimacy based on their adherence to the constitutive rule of the system-sovereign territoriality.
